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Reasonable Reliance and Apparent Authority:  
East Asia Company Ltd v PT Satria Tirtatama Energindo  




The Privy Council in East Asia Company Ltd v PT Satria Tirtatama Energindo (a case on 
appeal from Bermuda) has provided clarification on the correct approach to the reliance aspect 
of apparent authority.  Reliance can be of particular importance where the third party has been 
put on notice as to the agent’s lack of authority: e.g. when the transaction is unusual or 
especially onerous for the principal.  The Privy Council concluded, albeit obiter, that the 
correct test is one of reasonable reliance by the third party.  In doing so, it has rejected the 
approach adopted by Lord Neuberger NPJ in the Hong Kong case of Akai Holdings and 
subsequently followed in a number of English decisions: i.e. reliance by the third party is 
presumed in the absence of dishonesty or irrationality.  
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Introduction 
Apparent authority, a doctrine within agency law, can be of considerable importance to 
company and commercial lawyers.  A company necessarily acts through its agents, while a 
 
* University of Bristol Law School, Bristol, BS8 1RJ. Email: mark.campbell@bristol.ac.uk. I am grateful to the 
editors of Common Law World Review and an anonymous reviewer for suggestions made on an earlier draft. Any 
remaining errors are my own.  
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principal’s obligation to honour a contract may turn on the nature and extent of the authority 
with which its agent acts.  Actual authority, whether express or implied, is concerned with the 
relationship between principal and agent.  Apparent authority, by contrast, is about the 
relationship between principal and the third party dealing with the principal via the agent.  It 
has been said that apparent authority involves a ‘a form of estoppel’1 as it is constituted by a 
representation as to the agent’s authority from principal to third party and reliance on that the 
representation by the third party.  And as with the application of many, if not most, legal rules, 
where there is a dispute over an agent’s authority there can only be one winner: either the third 
party is entitled to hold the principal to the contract, or the principal is relieved of obligations 
under the alleged contract.  The law on apparent authority presents a challenge for courts as 
they seek to strike a balance between the interests of principal and third party, while 
maintaining coherence and predictability in the way the relevant legal rules are formulated and 
applied.  Appellate decisions in a number of common law jurisdictions have, in recent years, 
made important contributions to the development of this area of the law.2  East Asia Company 
Ltd v PT Satria Tirtatama Energindo (‘EACL v PT Satria’), a Privy Council case on appeal 
from Bermuda, is the latest of those contributions.3  
 
Facts 
East Asia Company Ltd (‘EACL’), a Bermudan company, was the owner of the entire share 
capital in another Bermudan company, Bali Energy Ltd (‘BEL’).  BEL, which had been in 
financial difficulties for a number of years, owned the rights to develop a geothermal energy 
 
1 Rama Corp Ltd v Proved Tin & General Investments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 147, 149 (Slade J). 
2 Most notably: First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194 (England); 
Thanakarn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat (Mahachno) v Akai Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2010] HKCFA 63, (2010) 13 
HKCFAR 479 (Hong Kong); Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB v Asia-Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
[2011] SGCA 22, [2011] 3 SLR 540 (Singapore); Kelly v Fraser [2012] UKPC 25, [2013] 1 AC 450 (Privy 
Council, Jamaica). 
3 [2019] UKPC 30. 
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site in Bali and was EACL’s sole asset.  Two of EACL’s directors, Mr Joenoes and Mr Hata, 
were also directors of BEL and were responsible for the day-to-day running of BEL.  At the 
end of 2014, PT Satria Tirtatama Energindo (‘PT Satria’), an Indonesian company, made 
contact with BEL with a view to purchasing the company.  PT Satria had previously conducted 
due diligence into BEL.  Following this contact from PT Satria, there followed a flurry of 
activity at board level within EACL and BEL, with Mr Joenoes and Mr Hata attempting to 
remove other directors and pass various resolutions.  Three key events were as follows.  First, 
on 27 February 2015 EACL and PT Satria purported to execute a heads of agreement document 
(‘HOA’) in relation to the sale of BEL to PT Satria, with Mr Joenoes signing on behalf of 
EACL.  Second, on 1 March 2015 Mr Joenoes and Mr Hata held a board meeting of EACL at 
which they passed a resolution supposedly approving the sale of BEL to PT Satria.  The minutes 
of that meeting did not, however, refer to the HOA or to the benefits that would accrue to Mr 
Joenoes and Mr Hata as a result of the transaction.  Third, also on 1 March 2015, Mr Joenoes 
signed a share transfer document on behalf of EACL. 
The other directors of EACL attempted to disclaim the sale of BEL to PT Satria, with 
Mr Joenoes and Mr Hata also removed as directors of EACL and BEL on 4 March 2015.  The 
boards of EACL and BEL also passed unanimous resolutions rejecting the purported transfer 
of shares in BEL as being ‘invalid, null and void’.  PT Satria then sought rectification of BEL’s 
register of members pursuant to the Bermuda Companies Act 1981.  The judge at first instance 
held that EACL was bound by the transaction and made the order for rectification sought by 




4 PT Satria Tirtatama Energindo v East Asia Company Ltd and another [2016] SC (Bda) 90 Com. 
5 East Asia Company Ltd v PT Satria Tirtatama Energindo [2016] CA (Bda) 20 Civ. 
  4 
 
The decision of the Privy Council 
PT Satria appealed to the Privy Council. Its appeal was dismissed (Lord Kitchin delivering the 
opinion of the Privy Council) for the central reason that Mr Joenoes lacked authority to act on 
behalf of EACL in relation to the transaction.6  By the time the case reached the Privy Council, 
PT Satria had abandoned any attempt to claim that Mr Joenoes had been acting with actual 
authority.  Although the company’s constitution allowed the board to appoint a managing 
director and delegate powers to that person, Mr Joenoes had never been appointed to that 
position.  The core issue in the case before the Privy Council was, therefore, apparent authority:  
i.e. whether Mr Joenoes had been acting with apparent authority when executing the HOA.  
The Privy Council, in agreement with the Court of Appeal of Bermuda, held that Mr 
Joenoes lacked the apparent authority for which PT Satria had been contending.  There were a 
number of reasons given for that conclusion, but two are of particular importance.  First, there 
was the extraordinary nature of the transaction. Although Mr Joenoes and Mr Hata carried on 
the day-to-day running of EACL and BEL, there was nothing to suggest that they had been 
authorised to sell EACL’s sole asset.7  That point was especially relevant given that both men 
stood to benefit financially from the transaction.   Second was the absence of any resolution or 
minute indicating that Mr Joenoes had authority to execute the HOA on EACL’s behalf. Nor 
was there a declaration of interest by Mr Joenoes or Mr Hata as to the benefits that would have 
accrued to them.8  The facts, therefore, led to the conclusion there had been no representation 
from EACL to PT Satria that Mr Joenoes had authority to transfer of shares in BEL.  It was, 
moreover, held that the transaction was avoidable by EACL and that BEL had refused to 
register the transfer within the three-month period allowed by the relevant Bermudan 
 
6 EACL v PT Satria (n 3), paras 39–69, especially paras 65 and 66.  
7 Ibid, para 58. 
8 Ibid, para 60.  
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legislation.9  That said, the most noteworthy aspect of the Privy Council’s opinion is the obiter 
passage on the question of reliance by the third party.10 
 
The rejection of Akai Holdings 
Given the Privy Council’s conclusion that EACL had not made the representation (for which 
PT Satria was contending) in relation to the authority of Mr Joenoes, the question of reliance 
by PT Satria fell away as a live issue.  If, however, the opposite conclusion had been reached 
it would have been necessary to consider the following question: was PT Satria entitled to rely 
on the representation from EACL if it had been put on notice as to the agent’s lack of authority?  
The parties had made submissions on that point and the Privy Council thought it would be 
‘helpful to state [its] view’.11  In doing so, the Privy Council chose to address the controversial 
approach taken by Lord Neuberger (sitting as a non-permanent judge of Hong Kong’s Court 
of Final Appeal) in the Akai Holdings case.12  There Lord Neuberger had decided that where 
the principal has represented the agent has the relevant authority the third party is, in the 
absence of irrationality or dishonesty, entitled to rely on the representation.13  In effect, Lord 
Neuberger was saying that the question to ask was whether the third party had acted irrationally 
or dishonestly by relying on the representation as to the agent’s apparent authority rather than 
whether it had acted (un)reasonably.  Although Lord Neuberger had queried whether there 
would in practice be much different between the two approaches,14 the Court of Appeal of 
Bermuda did reach different conclusions when applying the alternative tests to the facts of 
EACL v PT Satria.15 If the Akai Holdings approach had been the correct test as a matter of 
 
9 Ibid, paras 96–109. 
10 Ibid, paras 70–95. 
11 Ibid, para 74. 
12 Akai Holdings (n 2), paras 49–62. 
13 Ibid, paras 62 and 75. 
14 Ibid, para 50. 
15 EACL v PT Satria (n 5), para 136. 
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Bermudan law, PT Satria would have succeeded on the reliance point for the following reason. 
Clarke JA was ‘not persuaded that we should find that PT Satria or Mr Suhardono did not 
honestly believe that Joenoes had such authority or that such a belief was irrational, reckless 
or involved turning a blind eye’16   
Having considered a number of authorities relevant to the matter, the Privy Council 
rejected the Akai Holdings approach to reliance, which it considered out of step with those 
authorities. It disagreed with Lord Neuberger’s attempt to distinguish a number of authorities 
considered in Akai Holdings.17  Had the reliance issue been a live one, the Privy Council would 
have addressed it as follows: ‘PT Satria could not rely upon the apparent authority of [the 
agent] if it failed to make the inquiries that a reasonable person would have made in all the 
circumstances in order to verify that he had that authority.’18  The Privy Council has, therefore, 
confirmed that the correct approach should be a test of reasonableness.  As cases such as EACL 
v PT Satria indicate, the reasonableness of the third party’s reliance can assume particular 
importance where the agent is attempting to commit the principal to a transaction that is unusual 
or which may be contrary to the interests of the principal. 
 
Comment 
The most obvious point to make is that the Privy Council applied the principles relevant to the 
representation aspect of apparent authority in an uncontroversial manner.  Before the Privy 
Council there was no attempt to rely on Kelly v Fraser19 by alleging that Mr Joenoes, even if 
lacking apparent authority to conclude the transaction, nevertheless had apparent authority to 
communicate the approval of EACL’s board of directors.20  PT Satria’s claim that Mr Joenoes 
 
16 Ibid, para 133.   
17 EACL v PT Satria (n 3), para 90–92. 
18 Ibid, para 93. 
19 Kelly v Fraser (n 2). 
20 EACL v PT Satria (n 3), para 61. 
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was acting with apparent authority was addressed on the basis of a traditional understanding of 
the law.  Although the discussion of reliance by the third party was obiter, it is that aspect of 
the Privy Council’s decision that will be of most interest and the most likely reason for citing 
the case in the future.  There are, it is suggested, several reasons why rejection of the Akai 
Holdings approach to reliance was the correct decision.  
The first is the weight of authority supporting reasonable reliance as the correct 
approach.  In particular, Lord Neuberger’s attempt to distinguish the constructive notice cases 
and to align apparent authority with misrepresentation does not find support in the case law.21  
Second, reasonable reliance as the appropriate test has a much better fit as a matter of principle 
and consistency.  Within private law, especially the law of obligations, reasonableness is the 
usual approach.  Remoteness of damage is assessed on the basis of reasonable foreseeability, 
contractual provisions are interpreted from the stance of the reasonable person, breach of a 
common law duty of care (i.e. negligence liability) is concerned with what the reasonable 
person would have done or refrained from doing, and so on.  Moreover, as noted in Bowstead 
& Reynolds on Agency, two related enquiries are assessed according to a test of reasonableness 
(Watts and Reynolds, 2018: 8.50)  One is the question of contractual formation according to 
the standard rules on offer and acceptance.  The other is the representation from principal to 
third party that comes prior to the question of reliance.  Given the widespread use of 
reasonableness as the relevant test (including its relevance to related enquiries), it would be 
odd if a third party’s attempt to rely on the principal’s representation was not judged from the 
same perspective. 
Third, observing that the approach taken in Akai Holdings is premised, in part at least, 
on a distinction between what is reasonable and what may be rational but unreasonable, one 
 
21 Ibid, paras 76–92.  
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might question whether such a distinction is tenable in the first place.  Indeed, on one view 
reasonableness and rationality are identical: ‘Properly understood, rationality … is exactly the 
same as reasonableness.’ (Gardner and Macklem, 2004: 474).  While an analysis of that 
distinction, or lack thereof, is beyond the scope of this short piece, the reference to irrationality 
in Akai Holdings is, I suggest, unhelpful for another reason.  Business people, at least according 
to what one reads in the law reports, tend not to act irrationally.  They may act for good reasons 
or bad reasons, honestly or dishonestly, in good faith or in bad faith, but rarely irrationally.  
Indeed, if someone is acting in a genuinely irrational manner, we might be prompted to call 
into question their capacity to enter into contracts or otherwise handle their own affairs.  Their 
ability to continue acting as a company director could even be challenged.22   
Fourth, there is a burden of proof question raised by Akai Holdings. In Akai Holdings 
Lord Neuberger acknowledged that ‘the third party must establish that it relied on the apparent 
authority of the alleged agent’, but was concerned about ‘placing too high a hurdle for third 
parties seeking to establish a claim in apparent authority.’23  He then went on to say the 
following:  
 
In my view, once a third party has established that the alleged agent had apparent 
authority, i.e. that the principal held out the alleged agent as having authority to bind 
the principal, and that the third party has entered into a contract with the alleged agent 
on behalf of the principal, then, in the absence of any evidence or indication to the 
contrary, it would be an unusual case where reliance was not presumed.24 
 
22 See e.g. Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 SI 2008/3229, Sch 2, para 18(e). See also Re CEM 
Connections Ltd [2000] BCC 917 where it was held that an individual, in the context of mental illness and illicit 
drug use, had not given valid consent to their appointment as a director.    
23 Akai Holdings (n 2), paras 72, 74. 
24 Ibid, para 75 (emphasis added). 
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If reliance is to be presumed in the absence of irrationality or dishonesty, there is an arguable 
case for saying (even if de facto rather than de jure) the burden of proof would be on the 
principal to demonstrate the third party’s irrationality or dishonesty in order to rebut the 
presumption of reliance.  A test of reasonable reliance, on the other hand, suggests that it is the 
third party, as the party seeking to enforce the contract, who bears the burden of proving that 
its reliance was reasonable.  The latter approach is, once again, more consistent with related 
legal enquiries and private law more generally.  
Fifth, we can observe the rationale given by Steyn LJ (as he then was) in First Energy 
(UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd as underpinning the decision in that case and 
more generally pervading the law of contract: ‘the reasonable expectations of honest men must 
be protected.’25  Apparent authority can involve a delicate balance between the interests of the 
principal (attempting to deny contractual liability) and the third party (seeking to hold the 
principal to the alleged contract).  While the principal’s representation will usually concern an 
agent’s authority to conclude the transaction on behalf of the principal, the decision in First 
Energy (now bolstered by Kelly v Fraser) recognises that, in certain circumstances, the 
principal may represent that the agent has authority to communicate the principal’s approval. 
First Energy, in expanding what might count as a representation from principal to third party, 
tips the balance in favour of third parties, a point on which supporters and detractors of the 
decision would be likely to agree.  If a third party is able to take advantage of a more relaxed 
approach towards the principal’s representation, and if that approach is supposedly 
underpinned by ‘the reasonable expectations of honest men’, it is not unfair to require that the 
third party’s reliance on the representation be subjected to a test of reasonableness.  
 
25 First Energy (n 2) 196 
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In the years since Akai Holdings, Lord Neuberger’s approach to reliance has been 
followed in a number of English cases,26 including the Court of Appeal’s decision in Quinn v 
CC Automotive Group Ltd.27  Decisions of the Privy Council are not strictly binding in the 
English courts, albeit that they are, in general, treated as highly persuasive.  And although the 
Privy Council is entitled to state explicitly that its decision in a particular case represents the 
English legal position,28 there is no such direction in EACL v PT Satria.  Having said that, Lord 
Kitchin’s examination of relevant authorities suggests that those English decisions which have 
followed Akai Holdings on the reliance point have done so in error.  The Akai Holdings 
approach should therefore be rejected as a matter English law, not because the Privy Council 
has said so explicitly but because the analysis of relevant authorities in EACL v PT Satria 
indicates that Akai Holdings is out of step with the English precedent.  When a suitable 
opportunity arises in Hong Kong, there will no doubt be an attempt to persuade the courts in 
that jurisdiction to reconsider the reliance question.  English lawyers will be aware that, within 
the jurisdictions of the UK, where the principal is a company the common law rules on apparent 
authority must be read in the light of statutory provisions, currently contained in the Companies 
Act 2006, that abolish the ultra vires and constructive notice doctrines.29  Section 40(1) says 
that: ‘In favour of a person dealing with a company in good faith, the power of the directors to 
bind the company, or authorise others to do so, is deemed to be free of any limitation under the 
company's constitution.’ Although the scope of the protection afforded by s 40 is a moot point 
(Watts and Reynolds, 2018: 8.37), the question of reasonable reliance by a third party is still 
likely to be of some importance where, as in EACL v PT Satria, a company director acts beyond 
his or her usual authority.   
 
26 EACL v PT Satria (n 3), para 84. 
27 [2010] EWCA Civ 1412, [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 584. 
28 Willers v Joyce (No 2) [2016] UKSC 44, [2018] AC 843, para 21 (Lord Neuberger). 
29 There are no equivalent statutory provisions in Bermuda: EACL v PT Satria (n 5), para 129 (Clarke JA). 
  11 
There is a final point to make.  Although Lord Sumption retired from the UK Supreme 
Court in December 2018, at the time EACL v PT Satria was decided he was, along with Lord 
Neuberger, on the Supplementary Panels for both the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council.  Given his contributions to this area of the law, it is a pity he 
was not part of the Board for EACL v PT Satria.  In the earlier Privy Council case of Kelly v 
Fraser Lord Sumption sought to explain the ambit of First Energy and its relationship to 
Armagas v Mundogas, a key House of Lords’ decision on apparent authority.30  In Akai 
Holdings, as Jonathan Sumption QC and counsel for one of the parties, he was the one who 
had argued successfully before Lord Neuberger that, in the context of apparent authority, the 
focus should not be the reasonableness of the third party’s conduct but rather the absence of 
irrationality or dishonesty.  Had Lord Sumption been part of the panel for EACL v PT Satria it 
would have been interesting to see whether he had experienced a change of heart. Likewise, 
with Lord Neuberger.   
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